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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ADAPTIVE RESPONSES TO RISK AND THE IRRATIONALLY
EMOTIONAL PUBLIC

MOLLY J. WALKER WILSON*
INTRODUCTION
The Enlightenment concept of a reason–emotion duality is very much alive
today, particularly in the multidisciplinary body of scholarship on risk policy,
where much of the commentary laments the “distorting” influence of emotion
on the public’s thinking about risk.1 Concerns that an emotionally volatile and
largely ignorant public can hijack the legislative process pervade risk-policy
scholarship, particularly among those writing in the increasingly influential
area of behavioral decision theory.2 Yet, a small but growing number of

* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. J.D., University of Virginia;
Ph.D., University of Virginia. Thanks to Joel Goldstein for the invitation to participate in this
Childress Symposium, to john powell for inspiring this Article, and to all of the organizers and
panelists who made the event so successful.
1. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 82
(2005) (“Emotional reactions to risk, and probability neglect, also account for ‘alarmist bias.’”);
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 14 (2004) (advocating the
use of cost-benefit analysis by regulators when shaping responses to catastrophic risk); Ruth F.
Weiner, Comment on Sheila Jasanoff’s Guest Editorial in Risk Analysis, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 495,
495–96 (1993); Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, Commitment, and
Imagination in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623, 626 (2009) (discussing the
drafters of the United States Constitution as subscribing to a theory based in part on the “widely
accepted propositions that still enjoy widespread acceptance in contemporary constitutional
culture,” namely, the reason and emotion duality, which were seen as diametrically opposed).
2. One of the more well-known papers arguing that social exchange distorts public risk
response is Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 89 (“When emotions lead people
to probability neglect, the alarm shown by others is highly likely to be playing a role. When
citizens fixate on a worst-case scenario, social processes are probably ensuring that they do so.”);
James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV. 1641, 1670 (2008)
(discussing how social exchange of information can lead to risk aversion in a medical setting);
Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order
Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 105 (2009) (“If the behavioralists were in
charge, they would insist that legal doctrine and judging should account for these predictable
failures of rationality and that, without accounting for such failures, no interpretation of text or
pursuit of efficiency could possibly yield rational, much less optimal, results.”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 103–04 (2002)
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commentators from anthropology, psychology, sociology, law, and related
disciplines argue that some nonrational features of choice formation that were
traditionally viewed as problematic may be indispensable to optimal decisionmaking.3 In this Article, I focus on contributions from social science that
suggest the need for a fresh look at the role of emotion and its cultural
influences on private and public decisions about potential sources of harm. I
argue that affect-based responses to risk are properly viewed as expressions of
individual values, world views, and personal preferences and, as such, achieve
legitimacy as a basis for risk policy. In advancing this argument, I align my
perspective with that of Dan Kahan4 and others who advance an optimistic
view of the role of emotion in public risk response.5
I. TRADITIONAL RISK ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY
Risk dominates our modern social, cultural, and legal landscape. Ulrich
Beck, the German sociologist, has argued that over the past century, we have
moved from a culture of scarcity to a culture of risk.6 Beck’s characterization
is echoed by the American political scientist Aaron Wildavsky who famously
remarked, “How extraordinary! The richest, longest-lived, best-protected,
most resourceful civilization, with the highest degree of insight into its own
technology, is on its way to becoming the most frightened.”7 One obvious
source of fear is the media, who, along with public figures and private citizens,
take advantage of the burgeoning of new channels of communication that carry
information about risks into households and workplaces all over America.8
Another reason for the twenty-first century shift in attention to risks is the
changing nature of the dangers we face. Many risk researchers have
emphasized the novelty of today’s harms, the unseen potential effects on
individual health, collective well-being, and the potential for irreversible

(advocating that government should work to reduce quasi-rational but real fears due to the
economic costs caused by such fears).
3. See infra Part II.
4. For a full discussion of Kahan’s claim, see Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion
in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 741 (2008).
5. Emotion researchers and others writing in the areas of behavior and brain science have
occasionally offered different definitions for “emotion” and “affect.” I use the terms
interchangeably throughout this article, but acknowledge that to do so is not without controversy.
See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Response, Emotions, Values, and the Construction of Risk, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 421, 424 n.13 (2008), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/
03-2008/Bandes.pdf (“The terms ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’ are sometimes used interchangeably and
sometimes to connote different concepts. Neither has a single accepted meaning.”).
6. See ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 19 (1992).
7. Aaron Wildavsky, No Risk Is the Highest Risk of All, 67 AM. SCIENTIST 32, 32 (1979).
8. David L. Altheide, The News Media, the Problem Frame, and the Production of Fear, 38
SOC. Q. 647, 664 (1997).
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damage to the planet.9 As renowned risk researcher Paul Slovic has pointed
out:
In recent decades, the profound development of chemical and nuclear
technologies has been accompanied by the potential to cause catastrophic and
long-lasting damage to the earth and the life forms that inhabit it. The
mechanisms underlying these complex technologies are unfamiliar and
incomprehensible to most citizens. Their most harmful consequences are rare
and often delayed, hence difficult to assess by statistical analysis and not well
10
suited to management by trial-and-error learning.

As the salience of hazards reaches the saturation point, a variety of schools
of thought offer opposing perspectives on how we ought to craft responses to
potential sources of harm. The foundation of the current discussion is criticism
of the neoclassical economic notion that human beings apply reason (in the
traditional sense of the word) to arrive at certain, fixed truths.11 The
Enlightenment idea that we can observe our complex world and, acting
rationally, arrive at universal truths about what will harm or kill us, has been
seriously undermined by empirical findings from modern behavioral science.12
The established fact that human beings are influenced by nonrational
considerations has led some to argue that members of the public should be
largely excluded from participating in risk-policy decisions.13
Although most of the relevant empirical studies on human decision-making
have been conducted within the past forty years, conclusions drawn from this
body of scholarship have largely reinforced prior existing notions about the
proper role of the polity in direct policy formation.14 Large-scale risk
decisions historically have not been trusted to the masses. As a rule,
conventional risk analysis was—and still is—conducted by investigators

9. Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, Apr. 17, 1987, SCIENCE at 280, 280 (1987) [hereinafter
Slovic, Perception of Risk].
10. Id.
11. Olivier Jean Blanchard, Neoclassical Synthesis, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, 634–36 (1987).
12. See Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 9, at 281.
13. Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment
Battlefield, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 59 (1997). “[Public risk judgments] are seen as irrational
by many harsh critics of public perceptions. These critics draw a sharp dichotomy between the
experts and the public. Experts are seen as purveying risk assessments, characterized as
objective, analytic, wise, and rational—based on the real risks. In contrast, the public is seen to
rely on perceptions of risk that are subjective, often hypothetical, emotional, foolish, and
irrational.” Id. at 60.
14. This assertion obviously implicates the role of participatory democracy in this country,
an issue with complex and fascinating historical and political connotations, the consideration of
which are beyond the scope of this Article.
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working in the so-called “hard sciences.”15 Decisions about how to regulate
potential sources of harm and how to allocate resources are often based upon
cost–benefit analyses that are data-driven and purportedly rational.16 In many
circumstances, statistic-based information that serves as the basis for risk
responses is treated as “fact.”17 But allocation of national resources, decisions
that prioritize certain dangers, and efforts to regulate citizens’ behaviors based
upon statistical data may not comport with the preferences and priorities of all,
or even a majority of the public.
With respect to conventional risk analysis, there are two problems for
regulators and lawmakers. The first is a political, or at least a management,
problem: traditional risk analysis ignores or significantly underemphasizes
public response to various harms.18 This feature of risk analysis means that
policymakers are, first, unable to predict how members of society will view
specific dangers as the threats become salient to the public and, second, are ill
equipped to craft responses to risk that take into account public fear of these
hazards.19 The second problem with conventional risk analysis is normative:
namely, that any formula that leaves public sentiment out of the equation (or
purports to or attempts to) may be based upon questionable assumptions about
the appropriate basis for action or inaction. As Beck points out, as long as the
debate is “conducted exclusively or dominantly in the terms and formulas of
natural science” the danger exists that the “terms will inadvertently include
human beings in the picture only as organic material . . . it runs the risk of
atrophying into a discussion of nature without people, without asking about
matters of social and cultural significance.”20
Although traditional risk analysis has been profoundly influential, recent
interdisciplinary scholarship has detailed the myriad conscious and
nonconscious influences shaping risk preferences and policies. One example
of a deliberate, philosophical approach is the precautionary principle, which
specifies that when science is uncertain—particularly in the case of hazards
15. See MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY 49 (1992)
(discussing the ubiquitous nature of science, and its promise to provide answers, as experiencing
a heyday in the 1950s).
16. See Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual
Framework, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 177, 179 (1988) [hereinafter Kasperson et al., Social
Amplification]; Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 9, at 281.
17. And yet, “Assessment procedures derived from the public health, toxicity, and
engineering studies that have dominated the management programs of governments and
corporations illuminate one portion of the risk complex while concealing others.” Roger E.
Kasperson & Jeanne X. Kasperson, The Social Amplification and Attenuation of Risk, 545
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95, 96 (1996).
18. See Kasperson et al., Social Amplification, supra note 16, at 177.
19. Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 9, at 285 (arguing for the importance of the
public’s role in risk assessment).
20. See BECK, supra note 6, at 24.
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that may cause irreversible or catastrophic consequences—policies should
favor caution.21 Widespread adoption of the precautionary principle has
generated a considerable amount of debate.22 Nonconscious processes,
including mental shortcuts and biases that bear on individual and collective
judgment, have also received a great deal of attention in the risk-policy
literature. In particular, the interdisciplinary psychology and law, sociology,
anthropology, and political science fields have engaged related questions.23
One body of scholarship emphasizing cognitive research challenges
neoclassical economic theory regarding human judgment and decision-making.
Some fifty years ago, two now-famous articles, The Problem of Social Cost by
Ronald Coase24 and Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts
by Guido Calabresi25 marked the birth of law and economics along with
rational choice theory and its view that humans are rational actors who apply
logic to arrive at utility-maximizing decisions. The rational actor model came
under fire from critics who asserted that the model was poorly suited to
describing real-life human behavior. For example, the ground-breaking work
of Kahneman and Tversky, leading to the advent of prospect theory,26 paved
the way for subsequent research in behavioral decision theory on how people
21. The principle has been represented a variety of ways and in multiple contexts. One
example is the precautionary principle, which has been characterized in the following way:
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary
measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully
established scientifically. In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the
public, should bear the burden of proof. The process of applying the precautionary
principle must be open, informed and democratic and must include potentially affected
parties. It must also involve an examination of the full range of alternatives, including no
action.
Science and Environmental Health Network, Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary
Principle (Jan. 26, 1998), available at http://www.sehn.org/precaution.html.
22. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1003, 1003 (2003) (detailing the disadvantages associated with the stringent adoption of
precautionary approaches); see also Lesley Wexler, Limiting the Precautionary Principle:
Weapons Regulation in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459, 475–77
(2006) (advising caution on the application of the precautionary principle when it comes to
military grade pollutants).
23. See Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 9, at 281.
24. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42–44
(1960) (proposing that in the absence of transaction costs, initial allocation of entitlements will be
irrelevant, because parties will bargain to reach the most efficient result).
25. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (arguing for economically efficient allocation of tort liability).
26. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979); see generally Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3–20 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky
eds., 1982).
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actually—as opposed to theoretically—make decisions.27 The upshot of this
collective work is that humans simply do not have the cognitive capacity to
reason according to principles of logic, they have imperfect memories, they
rely on cognitive shortcuts, and they are subject to a variety of biases that make
much of human decision-making nonrational. One group of scholars writing in
the behavioral decision theory arena28 emphasizes a need to counteract or
combat faulty decision-making arising from irrational human decisionmaking.29
Emotion cues have been described as interfering with optimal decisions
because they can lead to choices other than those suggested by formal rules of
logic. Affect can influence a variety of decision paradigms, but it plays a
particularly important role in decisions about risks. Empirical research has
revealed a strong affective component to risk judgments.30 Traditional risk
analysis, which purports to be based on fact, denies a legitimate role for
affect.31 Likewise, many behavioral decision theorists view emotion as a

27. A very small subset of the articles relating to Kahneman and Tversky’s work include
Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern Economic
Formalisim in Contract Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 943 (2009); Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk
Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115 (2003); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias
and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); Douglas A. Kysar, The
Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The
Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003); Alan Schwartz,
How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2008); Cass R.
Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556 (2004). For a review of
recent books influenced by prospect theory and related theories of human cognition, see On Amir
& Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and Policy,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098 (2008) (discussing the books, RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008)
and DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS (2008)).
28. The term “behavioral decision theory” or “behavioral decision theorist” is used in this
article to represent the loose group of scholars who rely heavily upon the seminal work of
Kahneman and Tversky’s work to analyze human decision-making and behavior as it pertains to
legal and governmental institutions and policies. A great number of scholars in this area focus on
the limitations of human cognition, and particularly the heuristics and biases that can result in
nonrational judgments.
29. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 252 (1998);
see also Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1243–44, 1255 (2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The
Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1177–1206 (2003)
(providing some examples of arguments along these lines).
30. Paul Slovic, Affect, Reason, and Mere Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 191, 195 (2007)
[hereinafter Slovic, Hunches].
31. See Kasperson et al., supra note 16, at 177 (stating that traditional risk analysis focuses
primarily on the probability and magnitude of risk).
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source of bias with the potential to distort judgment in a variety of ways.32
Legal scholarship cites the potential for fear or outrage to cause people to
overestimate the risk posed by certain crimes, nuclear energy, terrorism,
pesticides, Communism . . . the list goes on.33 Because the public at large does
not have ready access to scientific data and lacks sophistication regarding
statistics and issues of proof, members of society are deemed vulnerable to
emotional appeals—particularly those based upon fear. Traditional risk
analysis excludes the public primarily because the public is uninformed.
Behavioral decision theorists would exclude the public because the public is
impassioned. Both counsel that risk regulation be assigned to politically
insulated experts whose judgments are supposedly free of emotion’s distorting
impact.34
Unequivocally, certain cognitive patterns interfere with optimal decisionmaking under some circumstances. It is not clear, however, that emotions
create sufficiently serious problems for judgment formation so as to justify
insulating the public from risk decisions. Interdisciplinary efforts over the past
thirty years have yielded a rich and nuanced picture of public risk perception.35
Not only does emotion accompany risk judgments, it increasingly appears to
assist the decision-maker in forming those judgments. Slovic notes that
“[w]hile we may be able to ‘do the right thing’ without analysis (e.g., dodge a
falling object), it is unlikely that we can employ analytic thinking rationally
without guidance from affect somewhere along the line. Affect is essential to
rational action.”36

32. Slovic, supra note 13, at 59.
33. See, e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 689; Cass Sunstein, Irreversible and
Catastrophic: Global Warming, Terrorism, and Other Problems, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 7
(2005–2006). Supporting the notion that emotions can cause irrational decision-making is the
dual system concept of reasoning. System 1 reasoning is “fast, automatic, effortless, associative,
and often emotionally charged.” Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology
for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003). On the other hand, System 2
reasoning is slow and deliberate, and it is more likely to include consideration of probabilities and
careful weighing of costs and benefits. Id. The implication of this view is that System 1 is
necessary in situations where there is a lack of information and resources but that it is more likely
to result in error than System 2. Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 747–48 (2008).
34. For examples of works that propose substituting public risk decisions with those of
unbiased experts, see Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 737, and Cass R. Sunstein, LAWS OF
FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 126 (2005).
35. A number of commentators have pointed out that emotions are more than hurdles to
overcome in applying rational reasoning. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 5, at 422 (“Although
emotions are often portrayed as bursts of feeling that intrude upon rational thought from time to
time, this view is out of step with current findings across a range of disciplines.”).
36. Slovic, Hunches, supra note 30, at 194.
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II. OTHER APPROACHES TO RISK PERCEPTION
In addition to Traditional Risk Analysis and Behavioral Decision Theory,
there are several other important sources of scholarship in the risk perception
area. The first is the Psychometric Study of Risk Perception, which can be
characterized as an attempt to derive a “cognitive map” of risk perceptions.37
This approach relies upon survey data to determine attitudes about a wide
variety of risks with the goal of understanding the characteristics of a risk most
likely to cause human beings concern.38 The Social Amplification of Risk
(SAR) Theory builds and expands upon the psychometric paradigm by
including a dynamic model describing how information about risk is amplified
or attenuated as it travels via channels of social discourse.39 This model
includes consideration of cultural and symbolic understandings of risk along
with the potential for risk events to serve as signals portending future harms.40
As the foundational article in this area points out: “[R]isk has meaning only to
the extent that it treats how people think about the world and its relationships.
Thus, there is no such thing as ‘true’ (absolute) and ‘distorted’ (socially
determined) risk.”41 SAR is particularly useful in the discussion of emotional
reactions to risks because it identifies the underlying source of many affective
reactions: culture.
Empirical and theoretical scholarship in the areas of psychology,
sociology, and anthropology has long viewed emotional responses as rooted in
cultural understandings. It has been remarked: “Feelings are not substances to
be discovered in our blood but social practices organized by stories that we
both enact and tell.”42 Increasingly, the link between culture and emotions is
being recognized by writers outside of the social sciences, particularly those in
the legal academy.43 Specifically, while basic emotions such as fear, disgust,
surprise, and joy are universally experienced to some degree, the more
complex nuances of emotional reactions vary depending upon associated

37. PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 222 (2000).
38. See Baruch Fischoff et al., How Safe is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes
Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 POL’Y SCI. 127, 130 (1978).
39. See Kasperson et al., Social Amplification, supra note 16, at 182.
40. Id. at 178–79.
41. Id. at 181.
42. Michelle Z. Rosaldo, Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling, in CULTURE
THEORY: ESSAYS ON MIND, SELF, AND EMOTION 137, 143 (Richard A. Shweder & Robert A.
LeVine eds., 1984).
43. See, e.g., Gewirtzman, supra note 1, at 630 (“‘[C]onstitutional culture’ often transcends
the legalistic and the logical, with emotion functioning as an essential predicate for the American
constitutional regime and a vehicle for collective expression of social aspirations.” (internal
citation omitted)).
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cultural meanings.44 Scholars have stated to explore the ways in which
emotions are “scripted” by culture.45 Our traditional understanding of
emotions as rooted in biology have more recently been supplemented by a
complimentary interpretation of social norms and socially-derived reactions to
various situations.46 Evocative triggers make little sense when interpreted in a
vacuum, absent from cultural interpretation and variability.47 In the context of
risk perception, providing emotions and the relevant culture-based norms have
received special attention.48 It has been noted, for example, that triggers for
public “panics” vary from one country to another, evidence that fear about
harms is largely influenced by societal expectations and understandings.49
Although psychometric risk analysis explicitly uses emotion (dread) as one
measure of concern for harms, and the Social Amplification of Risk theory
includes consideration of cultural inputs, neither directly address the question
of what value, if any, emotions and culture have in the risk policy debate. For
a normative perspective on the proper role of culture and emotion in risk
perception, we must look elsewhere. One potential source of insight is cultural
anthropologist Mary Douglas, who was an early advocate of the cultural theory
of risk perception. Douglas argued, first, that cultural understandings have a
profound impact on public perceptions of risk, and, second, that attitudes about
risk based upon cultural norms are legitimate—or at least inevitable—bases for
risk response.50 Douglas asserts that by failing to recognize cultural

44. See Klaus R. Scherer, Evidence for Both Universality and Cultural Specificity of
Emotion Elicitation, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 172, 175 (Paul
Ekman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994) for the notion that cultural understandings and norms
underpin most emotional responses.
45. See Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 851, 864–65 (2009) (“[Emotional common sense] is shaped and bounded by culture, which
imposes on our emotions ‘a recognizable, meaningful order, so that we may not only feel but
know what we feel and act accordingly.’”) (quoting CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 80 (1973)).
46. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE
MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 51 (1999).
47. Id.
48. Paul Slovic has said:
I believe that the multidimensional, subjective, value-laden, frame-sensitive nature of
risky decisions, as described above, supports a very different view, which Dean and
Thompson call ‘the contextualist conception.’ This conception places probabilities and
consequences on the list of relevant risk attributes along with voluntariness, equity, and
other important contextual parameters.
Slovic, supra note 13, at 67.
49. Other aspects of the risk context, such as how a risk is framed is similarly important to
human understanding and to the production of fear or dread. A detailed discussion of rhetorical
and other influences on risk perception is beyond the scope of this Article.
50. See DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 5–7 (explaining that communities define danger and
assess blame in order to protect the common good); see also MARY DOUGLAS & AARON
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antecedents of risk perception, risk policy makers inevitably impose their own
cultural biases on those for whom they make risk decisions.51 Douglas
suggests that purportedly value-neutral scientists and policy analysts have been
doing this for years.52 The troublesome aspect of how decisions are made is
not the lack of neutrality—as predilections and biases are inevitable
characteristics of human judgment—but rather, the assertion that decisions are
value-neutral. The claim of neutrality risks inappropriately or prematurely
subjugating the will of members of the public to that of scientists and policy
experts. Importantly, as Douglas writes, “[the risk researcher’s] method
assumes that all humans have the same responses and preferences that are
enshrined in the utilitarian philosophy. Instead of objectivity, we find
ideological entrenchment.”53
Douglas was among the first to emphasize the inevitability of the role of
emotion in decisions about sources of harm, stating, “Anger, hope, and fear are
part of most risky situations.”54 Subsequent researched has provided ample
evidence to support Douglas’s view of emotion as integral to risk perception.
Slovic and his colleagues have found that judgments about threats posed by
various harms were correlated with emotional valence, as measured by rating
the activity on bipolar scales such as good/bad, nice/awful, dread/not dread,
and so forth.55 This finding suggests that people base their judgments of an
activity or a technology not only on what they think about it but also on how
they feel about it. Of course, the emotions that people report when assessing
dangers may simply be a byproduct of rational, analytic decisions about risk.56
This possibility was tested using a variety of research paradigms involving
manipulating affect and holding analytic information constant. Although cause
and effect is difficult to definitively demonstrate, empirical findings from this
line of work suggest that the primary catalyst for judgments is emotional
reactions, rather than effortful reasoning processes, and that reasoning
supplements or justifies judgments that are formed largely based upon
WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ARTICLE ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 6–7 (1982) (“[D]ifferent social principles that guide behavior affect
the judgment of what dangers should be most feared, what risks are worth taking, and who should
be allowed to take them.”).
51. DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 11.
52. Id.
53. DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 13. As Douglas writes, “When he brackets off culture from
his work, the well-intentioned risk analyst has tied his own hands. He wants to be free of bias, he
would rather pretend that bias is not important than sully himself by trying to categorize kinds of
bias.” Id.
54. Id. at 12.
55. Early psychometric studies of risk perception showed that feelings of dread were the
major determinant of public perception and acceptance of risk for a wide range of hazards.
Fischhoff et al., supra note 38, at 149; Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 9, at 284–85.
56. Kahan, supra note 33, at 746.
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emotional reactions.57 Findings from psychological studies on choice
formation suggest that decision makers often optimize outcomes when they
stick with initial “gut” judgments.58 Analyzing costs and benefits of various
courses of action, for example, often leads to a decision that people later regret
and one which is inconsistent with later behavior and preferences.59
The notion that affective reactions play a valuable role in decision-making
(even when deliberate reasoning is feasible) is consistent with the “cultural
evaluator” model advanced by Dan Kahan. The cultural evaluator model of
risk perception hypothesizes that emotional responses to risk reflect culturally
defined, expressive appraisals of potential sources of harm.60 Kahan writes,
“When people draw on their emotions to judge the risk that such an activity
poses, they form an expressively rational attitude about what it would mean for
their cultural worldviews for society to credit the claim that that activity is
dangerous and worthy of regulation . . . .”61 The cultural evaluator model
differs from both the neoclassical economic rational actor model (which would
deny that emotion plays any real role in risk decisions) and the behavioraldecision-theory emotion-as-bias model, by favoring an active, utilitarian role
for emotion. Because emotion serves as a signal of underlying values,62
emotional responses to risk can be understood as tools, guiding the individual
toward decisions that serve deeply held values and preferences, rather than
treating emotion as a source of bias. It is not, after all, irrational for members
of society to care about meanings and not just about consequences and to form
positions on risk that express their cultural values.63 As Kahan points out,
“individuals’ decisions to forgo or forbear risks is based not on the expected
utility of those actions but on their social meanings, which are unlikely to be
tied in any systematic way to the actuarial magnitude of those risks.”64 For an
individual assessing a risk, the maintenance of her worldview may well be
more important than making a decision that is supported by expert opinion,
particularly when to deviate from her own accepted worldview would lead to
cognitive dissonance and might threaten her self identity.
As should be clear, the cultural view is at odds with the notion that
“irrational” risk behavior is any choice that is not statistically supported. This
principle has particular implications for the behavioral decision theory

57. Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 13–14 (2000).
58. See TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE
UNCONSCIOUS 170 (2002).
59. Id.
60. Kahan, supra note 33, at 750.
61. Id. at 750–51.
62. Id. at 758.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 754.
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literature, where emotional reactions to potential sources of harm are often
discussed in the context of “probability neglect.” Probability neglect occurs
when individuals make choices that are deemed nonrational because the
choices do not reflect those choices that would be predicted by the probability
of a particular outcome.65 Probability neglect is discussed in the context of
emotion because experiments often reveal that triggering strong emotions in
people leads them to fear a potential source of danger “more than they should”
given the probability that the danger will actually materialize.66 The problem
with this understanding of choice as fundamentally irrational is that it treats
statistical outcomes as the only reasonable basis upon which to form choices.
An example is illustrative: suppose Sheila is particularly interested in
avoiding sudden, accidental death, such as death by automobile. She values
protection against such demise above protection from a death by complications
related to obesity-related diseases. Sheila invests substantial sums of money in
safety features for her automobile, and as she grows older, avoids driving in
poor weather or after dark. She simultaneously neglects to invest in weight
loss and exercise, instead suffering the risks associated with Type 2 diabetes.
Rhonda, on the other hand, has a preference pattern that is directly opposed to
that of Sheila’s. Rhonda’s self concept is consistent with the “no guts, no
glory.” Rhonda is terrified of dying from a slowly progressing, debilitating
disease; she is a “fitness fanatic” who invests in fast cars and rides a
motorcycle. The cultural evaluator model denigrates neither Sheila’s nor
Rhonda’s value and emotion-based preferences. Instead, they are accepted as
personal bases for risk decisions.
Of course, risk decisions vary tremendously. Some risk decisions only
affect certain subpopulations (or affect these groups disproportionately), while
other risk decisions influence most or all of the population. Risk preferences
may be different, depending upon who is affected by the decision (“self” or
“others”). Respondents’ attitudes also differ, and the response to a particular
question depends on whether the person perceives that the risk is to him- or
herself, on the one hand, or to members of an out-group, on the other. The
rationale expressed in the example of Sheila and Rhonda applies more broadly
to risks we perceive to populations to which we do not ourselves belong. Even
in arms-length situations where we might expect a more “rational” analytical
approach, preferences are important. For example, Bill chooses to donate
money to the Diabetes Foundation over other causes. He would continue to do
so even if he discovered that each dollar given to alternative Charity X results

65. See generally Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric
Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185 (2001) (demonstrating the
important role of affect in preferences for various lottery outcomes).
66. A commonly cited example can be found in JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND
DECIDING 246–47 (2001).
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in a higher percentage of lives saved. Bill may be motivated by the fact that he
has a beloved Aunt who is diabetic. Alternatively, Bill may view his continued
support of the Diabetes Foundation as loyalty to a cause (a value upon which
he places importance) and the fulfillment of an on-going commitment he has
made.67
There is a deeply personal value judgment inherent in many risk decisions.
To the extent that it makes sense to say that we prefer a particular mode of
injury or demise, we need to consider the possibility that the risks that are
over-feared are more emotionally charged because we are particularly
interested in avoiding death or injury by those means. The claim that human
beings should fear all threats with the same probability of injury or death to the
same extent is itself a value judgment. Moreover, decisions made that take
into account emotional states are more consonant with the human experience.
A “rational” choice may be supported by conventional statistics, but it may
also fail to maximize the decision maker’s well-being, and it may thus actually
be nonrational in a very real sense.68 In any risky choice, the individual’s
experience of hope and fear is part of the benefit or the harm.69 It has been
remarked, “If individuals’ factual beliefs are expressive of cultural worldviews,
then experts who treat those beliefs as ‘blunders’ unentitled to normative
respect in a ‘deliberative democracy’ are necessarily shielding regulatory law
from citizens’ visions of the good society.”70
CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that there are serious theoretical and practical
problems with supplanting individual risk choices with those of experts, who
are themselves not value-neutral. Some risky choices, such as whether to buy
insurance, drive a car, smoke, eat healthful foods, receive regular medical

67. As Robert Zajonc has pointed out, unlike other influences on action, “preferences [and
emotions] cannot be judged for accuracy or validity.” Robert B. Zajonc, Emotions, in 1 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 591, 597 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
68. See Rottenstreich & Hsee, supra note 65, at 190.
69. Id. (“[H]ope and fear may be crucial consequences in and of themselves. These feelings
are modeled by the S-shaped weighting function. Thus, although an S-shaped weighting function
surely leads to preferences that are incoherent, it may fully capture the decision maker’s actual
experience. In contrast, although expected utility’s identity weighting function leads to coherent
preferences, it may neglect crucial (affective) aspects of a decision maker’s experience.” (internal
citations omitted)).
70. Kahan, supra note 33, at 761 (emphasis omitted) (internal citation omitted). Dan Kahan
and Paul Slovic (who was integral to developing the psychometric and social amplification
models) take the position that “cultural worldviews pervade popular (not to mention expert) risk
assessments and that a genuine commitment to democracy forbids simply dismissing such
perceptions as products of ‘bounded rationality.’” Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Cultural
Evaluations of Risk: “Values” or “Blunders”?, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 166, 166 (2006).
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check-ups, and practice safe sex, reside with the individual. But many others
are dictated or influenced by public policy decisions made by a select few, on
behalf of the public.71 In theory, in a representative democracy, members of
society play an important role in shaping policy by exerting pressure on elected
officials. Yet sometimes a philosophy of paternalism becomes so prevalent
among policymakers that it becomes difficult for voters to identify and target
those lawmakers most likely to substitute their own risk preferences for those
of the individual citizen. In other instances, a majority of the electorate may
not object to certain restrictions on freedoms that simply render choices this
majority would already make inevitable. However, the acquiescence of some
citizens may adversely influence a sizable minority. Some situations justify
imposing restrictions on public risk decisions. Policies that are designed to
prevent gross inefficiencies, excessive public costs, or prevent the
victimization of certain powerless groups—such as in situations where there
are power imbalances, strategic actors, or free riding—may well be appropriate
and necessary. Nevertheless, lawmakers should be clear about when a policy
serves a specific, broader goal as compared to when it simply serves to save an
actor from his or her own “irrational” decision.
Traditional risk analysis has, through recent years, been more open to input
from the public. But some behavioral law researchers have resisted this trend,
suggesting that even when fully informed, the public’s passions will cloud
judgment and result in poor decision-making. An understanding of emotion as
an expression of underlying values provides a new framework for
understanding public perception of risk. This understanding argues against
leaving decisions in the hands of so-called experts, who are themselves
inevitably influenced by their own cultural worldviews, which may or may not
correspond with those of individual members of society.
The view I advocate argues in favor of soliciting more public feedback
about various risks, and suggests that when the government severely restricts
public involvement in risk decisions, it should do so only under limited
circumstances and in the face of clear and widespread misunderstanding,
misinformation, or distortion.72
Feedback from the public may be accumulated through a variety of
mechanisms, including public hearings, citizen advisory committees, surveys,
71. A brief list of examples include wearing seatbelts, investing in the military, supporting
fire and rescue personnel through taxes, paying a 911 surcharge on phone service, vaccinating
children, evacuating residential areas in times of natural disaster, and maintaining speed limits.
Like many risks, some of these precautionary measures may be designed to protect the public at
large. However, some risky choices that people are free to make if they choose have negative
effects for the public if certain harms surface.
72. Importantly, the conveyance of information about a risk can trigger incorrect responses
when the framing of the issue is misleading. For this reason, deliberate communication about risk
should be framed in a way that expresses a plurality of social meanings.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010] ADAPTIVE RESPONSES TO RISK AND THE IRRATIONALLY EMOTIONAL PUBLIC

1311

focus groups, and interactive technologies. Each of these methods has benefits
and drawbacks. A recent example was the town hall meetings discussing
health care reform over the summer of 2009, when the Obama Administration
was attempting to garner support for health care reform.73 One view maintains
that these meetings served primarily as forums for small, well-organized, and
politically motivated groups to dominate and distort the discussion.74
Regardless of whether this characterization is accurate, the town hall meetings
demonstrate the potential for public forums to serve as opportunities for
grandstanding. Employing a variety of methods of garnering public input can
avoid the distorting influence of a small, but vocal minority. Municipalities
and state policy-makers have already used the multimethod approach in cases
where a proposed plan will affect a large group of citizens for many years to
come. In the 1980s, for example, when New Jersey was revising its water
quality regulations, the state used various of methods for soliciting public
input, including a task force, informal focus groups, surveys, and public
hearings.75
When it comes to risk perception, the Enlightenment notion that every
person is capable of arriving at universal truths through empirical observation
has been debunked. Evidence supports the notion that when human beings
choose to confront or avoid risks, they are guided by culturally-based,
emotion-driven preferences. In many cases, our actions are not supported by
statistics derived from research in the hard sciences. This discrepancy exists
because we do not, as a rule, apply rules of logic and reason probabilistically.
Nevertheless, our emotion-based reactions have value in the risk decision
context. Selectively eschewing risks that are particularly threatening to our
own individual sense of identity or security increases our well-being in
substantial and important ways. It would be a mistake, therefore, to adopt a
policy that favors supplanting individual choice or collective preference with
expert opinion. Vital interests in privacy and autonomy mandate that we have
an active role in decisions regarding the dangers around us so that we may face
the perils of our own choosing and avoid those that cause us special terror.

73. See, e.g., Town Hall Meeting on Health Care Turns Ugly, CNN.COM, Aug. 18, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/07/health.care.scuffles/index.html
74. Jake Tapper, Democratic National Committee Suggests Town Hall Protestors are Fringe
Birther Mob, ABCNEWS.COM, Aug. 15, 2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/08/
democratic-national-committee-suggest-town-hall-protestors-are-fringe-birther-mob-.html (“The
White House suggestion that some of the anger seen at town hall meetings is ‘manufactured’
apparently wasn’t seen as strong enough, so the Democratic National Committee in a new web
video is depicting the protestors as irrational birthers who want to ‘destroy’ President Obama.”)
75. COMM’N ON BEHAVIORAL & SOCIAL SCIENCES & EDUCATION (CBSSE),
UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 205 Paul C. Stern &
Harvey V. Fineberg, eds., (1996).
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These are decisions that are profoundly influenced by our identities as social,
emotional, and cultural beings.

